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The matching of our epoch of existence with the approximate equality of dark energy and dark
matter energy densities is an apparent further fine-tuning, beyond the already troubling 120 orders
of magnitude that separate dark energy from the Planck scale. In this paper I will argue that the
coincidence is not a fine-tuning problem, but instead an artifact of anthropic selection. Rather than
assuming measurements are equally likely in all epochs, one should insist that measurements of
a quantity be typical amongst all such measurements. As a consequence, particular observations
will reflect the epoch in which they are most easily made. In the specific case of cosmology, most
measurements of dark energy and dark matter will done during an epoch when large numbers of
linear modes are available to observers, so we should not be surprised at living at such a time. This
is made precise in a particular model for the probability distribution for r = min
(
Ωm
ΩΛ
, ΩΛ
Ωm
)
, where
it is shown that if p(r) ∼ [N(r)]b (where N(r) is the number of linear modes, and b is some arbitrary
positive power), the probability that r is greater than its observed value of 0.4, is close to 1. Thus
the cosmological coincidence is no longer problematic.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Coincidence Problem
We live during a particularly interesting cosmological
epoch; not only are our skies filled with the riches of the
early universe, we are also fortunate enough to be alive
just as the era of matter gives way to that of dark en-
ergy. Somewhat more prosaically, we observe that the
fractional densities of matter and dark energy are about
the same: Ωm ∼ ΩΛ (the Ωi are defined as Ωi = ρi/ρcrit,
where i denotes the particular component of the universe
and ρcrit is the time-dependent critical density). This
“coincidence problem” is often viewed as a challenge for
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FIG. 1: The evolution of the different components of the uni-
verse, as a function of log a. The dashed line denotes Ωr, the
dotted line Ωm and the solid line ΩΛ. The shaded grey region
covers the short epoch (that we happen to live in) where ΩΛ
and Ωm are comparable in magnitude.
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models of dark energy, and even if not quite as troubling
as the problem of the magnitude of dark energy, explain-
ing the coincidence in question is far from straightforward
[1–3].
The apparent problem is starkly evident in figure 1,
which shows the evolutions of the fractional densities of
the various components of the cosmological fluid as func-
tions of the logarithm of the scale factor a. Notice that
only in an uncomfortably narrow band of log a are Ωm
and ΩΛ comparable. To make this discomfiture more pre-
cise I am going to follow Lineweaver and Egan in [4] and
define the useful parameter, r:
r = min
[
ΩΛ
Ωm
,
Ωm
ΩΛ
]
. (1)
The current value of r is around 0.4, and the coincidence
problem can be rephrased as a question about the prob-
ability of finding r & 0.4. As Lineweaver and Egan point
out, the expected value of r depends on one’s prior for
p(a), the probability distribution for when one expects
to live. Figure 2 (where I have replicated similar plots
from [4]) provides a stark visual representation of this
prior dependence. The miracle of “Why now?” is rather
less dramatic if the likelihood of our observation is flat
in linear rather than log time, although the problem is
still significant if we speculate on why we are not liv-
ing in the far future. Regardless of the choice of prior,
an examination of the shape of the plots makes it clear
that the coincidence problem results from the fact that
r approaches zero at large and small a, and it is at one
or both of these values that most of the probability lies,
assuming that one takes a flat prior for the x-axis posi-
tion that we happen to live at. If one assumes p(ln a) or
p(a) is flat, the probability of measuring r ∼ 1 depends
on time cutoffs (the details of these calculations can be
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2found in appendix A):
P (r ≥ 0.4) ∼ e−Htf , p(a) ∼ 1
P (r ≥ 0.4) ∼ 1
Htf − 23 ln tit1
, p(ln a) ∼ 1
As tf → ∞ both of the above probabilities approach 0,
and in the the case of p(ln a) ∼ 1 the same is true as
ti → 0.
As with many other deep issues in cosmology there
is no shortage of possible solutions to the coincidence
problem. These solutions can be usefully divided into
two categories: those which change the dynamics of the
universe and those which change our prior for p(a). For
the former class we have a host of dynamical dark energy
models (for a review of the taxonomy of such models
see [5]), some of which purport to solve the coincidence
problem, e.g. [6]. Solutions that change the prior for
p(a) are “selection effect” or “anthropic” explanations,
e.g. [3, 4, 7–10], and will be the focus of this paper.
Selection Effects and Anthropics
While the search for solutions to fine-
tuning/coincidence problems has been a powerful
heuristic in the progress of physics, one should should
remember that apparently unlikely events are often
not explained by new dynamics. As Weinberg notes
in [3] one striking historical example of this is the
distances of the planets from the sun; these follow no
particular pattern1 and the fine-tuning of conditions
on Earth for life is readily explained by conditioning
on the existence of life. Similar anthropic arguments
have proved fruitful in many cosmological settings, most
notably with regards to the value of the cosmological
constant [11, 12].
The term “the anthropic principle” [13] has come to en-
compass a large number of related concepts, all of which
share the notion that observations necessarily require ob-
servers. The refinement of anthropic notions most used
by cosmologists is Vilenkin’s “Principle of Mediocrity”
[14, 15], which can be readily phrased as a statement
about typicality:
“We should observe a universe that is typical
amongst those containing observers.”
As noted above, anthropic arguments have been ap-
plied to the coincidence problem by a number of authors.
For example, in [7] Garriga et al. point out that the co-
incidence between t0 (today) and tΛ (the time of dark
energy dominance) can be explained by assuming that
the number of observers is proportional to the amount
of carbon, so that most observations of the universe
1 Bode’s Law excepted.
should take place at the time of peak carbon produc-
tion, t0 ∼ tcarbon2. Noting that carbon peaks with star
formation (tSFR ∼ tcarbon), the authors find:
tΛ ∼ tG ∼ tSFR ∼ tcarbon ∼ t0 . (2)
tG is the time of galaxy formation, and the first two ap-
proximate equalities follow from anthropic (and other)
details of structure formation. Thus the coincidence
tΛ ∼ t0 is explained.
A complementary analysis has been carried by
Lineweaver and Egan [4]. Here the authors consider the
age distribution of terrestrial planets in the universe, im-
posing an additional offset (∆tobs = 4 Gyr) to account
for the delay between forming a planet and life evolving.
Within this framework they find that 68% of observers
emerge earlier than us, while 32% emerge later. Thus we
are typical amongst observers on terrestrial planets who
take around 4 billion years to evolve (the result is shown
to be robust for ∆tobs ≤ 10 Gyr). The argument is ex-
tended in [10] to apply to dynamical dark energy models,
with similar conclusions.
Although the arguments above are perfectly satisfac-
tory anthropic explanations for the coincidence problem,
they are not without problems:
• Carbon bias. Carbon-based, planet-bound life may
only be a small (atypical) subset of potential ob-
servers.
• Sensitivity to late time observers. If the typical
timescale for intelligent life to form is much greater
than that of carbon production or of terrestrial
planet formation, then the above methods are both
missing the majority of observers.
• What about the multiverse? If we take the mul-
tiverse seriously, we should really be analyzing all
parts of it with a suitably small dark energy com-
ponent, and not fixing the detailed astrophysics.
One way to assuage the these concerns is to be more
general in imposing selection effects. This can be done
by focussing on the particular observation being made.
To rephrase the “Principle of Mediocrity”:
“A measurement of a quantity should be typi-
cal of all possible measurements of that quan-
tity.”
To unpack that a little, consider the ratio r defined above;
when we ask that r not be finely tuned, we are really
asking that the value of r that we measure be typical
amongst all possible values that could possibly be mea-
sured. Now, if the number of measurements is indepen-
dent of time, we end up with the coincidence problem
2 This, of course, makes the reasonable assumption that on cos-
mological scales the timescale of intelligent life evolving from
available carbon can be ignored
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FIG. 2: The four plots (following those in [4]) show the the ratio r = min
[
ΩΛ
Ωm
, Ωm
ΩΛ
]
as a function of time. In each case the
vertical line denotes today and the shaded grey area marks the region where r & 0.05. Clockwise from the upper left the x
axis shows logarithmic scale factor, logarithmic time, linear time up to today and linear time until 100 Gyr. Note that one’s
impression of a coincidence depends strongly on the choice of time coordinate and one’s cutoffs.
outlined above. If, however, measurements are easier in
some epoch and harder in another and impossible in a
third, we have to take that into account when asking
what a typical measurement of r is.
Measuring r requires measuring both Ωm and ΩΛ, so
our distribution for typical values of r should account for
how easy it is to measure these quantities. As I shall
argue below, this amounts to relating the prior distri-
bution of r to the ease of measuring the expansion of
the universe. Essentially, in a universe with an accel-
erating component and with a decoupling scale (below
which matter no longer follows the Hubble flow), there is
a finite time when modes are available to do cosmology,
and the number of modes available is peaked near the
epoch of matter Λ equality. As a result the probability
of ΩΛ ∼ Ωm is close to 1.
The Measure Problem
I have so far left unmentioned the measure problem
(see [16] for an up-to-date overview of measures). This
oversight will be extended throughout most of the paper,
but it would be remiss of me not to spend a little time
on the issue.
The measure problem arises in eternal inflation be-
cause sensitivity of predictions to the choice of measure
on the populated landscape of possible vacua. This sen-
sitivity can have profound consequences for ones choice
of prior for where and when observers should expect to
find themselves in the multiverse. Examples of measure-
based solutions to the coincidence problem can be found
in [17, 18].
While in this paper I am focussing on an anthropic
approach, it is important to note that )as with all dis-
cussions of fine tuning is cosmology) considerations of the
measure may also be relevant and could affect my con-
clusions. That said, a measure-blind approach to issues
of selection and fine-tuning in cosmology has not been
without its successes in the past [11], and the present
work hopes to follow in those footsteps.
Organization
I shall provide the details of my argument that the
number of modes provides a good proxy for p(r) in sec-
tion II, following this with a derivation of the appropriate
4probability distribution and a calculation of P (r ≥ 0.4)
under various different assumptions. After this, in sec-
tion III, I will discuss the conclusions one might draw
from this sort of reasoning, along with a myriad of caveats
and qualifications.
II. MEASURING r
To make the above discussion on measuring r more
precise, let us begin considering how a general observer
may go about measuring ΩΛ and Ωm. Because matter
clumps, its presence can be detected through the mo-
tions of luminous test particles moving in the potential
well of a particular clump of matter. As such, sufficiently
clever cosmologists armed with sufficiently advanced in-
struments and sufficiently generous funding grants can
locate and “weigh” clumps of matter. Then, by adding
the masses of these clumps together the aforementioned
cosmologists can make reasonable estimates of Ωm during
almost all cosmological epochs (with the obvious caveat
that this argument requires luminous matter to roughly
track dark matter).
Measuring ΩΛ, however, is a different story. Assum-
ing there no significant spatial variations in the dark
energy density, ΩΛ can only be detected through mea-
surements of the Hubble expansion. This expansion is
detected through observations of the redshifts and dis-
tances of “objects” that are not gravitationally bound to
the observer. The greater the number of such objects, the
easier it is to measure the expansion. Although “number
of objects” is inherently a notion that depends on the
cosmological and astrophysical details of the particular
universe we find ourselves in, one has a reasonable proxy
in the number of linear modes (modes corresponding to
scales that have not undergone gravitational collapse) in
the observer’s Hubble radius that are larger than the
largest gravitationally bound (and thus decoupled from
the Hubble flow) structure.
There are several reasons why the use of N (the num-
ber of linear modes) is a good proxy for the number of
objects. Firstly, it bounds the maximum number of inde-
pendent (in the sense of the motion with the Hubble flow)
objects. As well as the number of modes, N also counts
the number of volumes within a Hubble radius that can
contain a single (at most) maximally-sized bound struc-
ture; thus N bounds the maximum number of such in-
dependent objects. Of course, a) “maximum” is not the
same as “number of” and b) each of these independent
volumes may contain many objects (for example, SNIa)
which can be used to measure distance. That said, so
long as the universe is isotropic it is reasonable to as-
sume that the number of objects should scale as N .
In addition to the above line of reasoning, we should
also note that N directly characterizes our ability to
measure cosmological parameters when we use the lin-
ear modes themselves as probes, as with the CMB (and,
in the future, with 21cm observations). Although such
measurements usually cannot constrain dark energy by
themselves (see [19] for an example of a CMB-only con-
straint on dark energy), they are an important part of our
ability to accurately determine cosmological parameters,
including r.
Finally, assuming an approximately scale-invariant
spectrum (as one has in our Hubble volume and would
have in other Hubble volumes with an inflationary period
in their past) also implies a correlation between number
of linear modes and objects. This follows since with a
scale-invariant spectrum the initial amount of power at
each scale is constant. Consequently the number of small
objects useful for probing cosmology should scale with N .
There are, of course, many other factors that will affect
the ease of measuring r. However, on the ground of main-
taining generality, I am going to ignore most of them.
One that might have a general applicability, though, is
the ability to discriminate between different cosmologies.
In particular the ability to tell an accelerating from non-
accelerating universe seems a prerequisite for measuring
r, and this is not independent of the value of r. This will
be discussed in more detail below.
In order to encompass a wider class of models than
simply vacuum energy, I shall present results for a cos-
mology consisting of matter with the equation of state
p = 0, and dark energy with the equation of state p = wρ,
where −1 ≤ w < −1/3. Then:
H2 =
1
3
(
ρm0
(a0
a
)3
+ ρΛ0
(a0
a
)3+3w)
. (3)
Here, as below, the reduced Planck mass, (8piG)−1/2 has
been set equal to 1 and the subscript 0 denotes the time
when the largest bound structure for a given observer
enters the Hubble radius. I have also assumed that we
are in a flat universe with Ωrad  1.3
I should emphasize that while the rest of this section
is littered with details of calculations, multiple plots and
several actual numbers, these are somewhat incidental to
the larger argument. The purpose of this paper is not to
claim that the probability of measuring r has some value
that can be calculated given a suitably detailed model
of physicists and the methods of observation. Rather, I
wish to point out that the apparent fine-tuning of the
coincidence problem is an artifact of an error in the typ-
ical choice of prior for the epoch in which cosmological
observers live. Once this error is corrected, by noting
that an appropriate prior for the epoch of measurement
will take into account the ease (or otherwise) of mak-
ing the measurement, one finds that the fine-tuning has
vanished. The particular analysis and numerical results
that follow should thus be considered as evidence for this
3 It would take a particularly delicate fine-tuning to arrange a
period of radiation domination close to the time of matter/dark
energy domination
5point of view, and a representative (rather than faithful)
model of reality.
A. Number of Measurements
The number of independent measurements that can
be made of the expansion of the universe depends on
the number of modes within a Hubble radius that are
not decoupled from the Hubble flow. In a universe of
matter and dark energy, modes enter the Hubble volume
of an observer during the epoch of matter domination and
exit during the epoch of dark energy domination, thus
there is only a finite period during which cosmological
measurements can be made.
Because the definition of r varies with time it is use-
ful to work with the quantities rm = ΩΛ/Ωm and rΛ =
Ωm/ΩΛ, which are equal to r = min
[
ΩΛ
Ωm
, ΩmΩΛ
]
when
ΩΛ < Ωm or Ωm < ΩΛ respectively. With these defi-
nitions, we have:
H2 =
ρΛ
3
(
1
rm
+ 1
)
,
ρΛ = ρΛ0
(a0
a
)3+3w
,
rm = r0
(a0
a
)3w
. (4)
Let k∗ be the comoving wavenumber corresponding to the
largest bound structure for a given observer, and consider
the quantity k∗/aH:
k∗
aH
=
k∗
a0H0
(
1 + r0
r
− 13w
0
) 1
2
(
r
− 13w
m
1 + rm
) 1
2
. (5)
If we set subscript 0 quantities as the initial time when
the mode corresponding to the largest bound structure
is equal in size to the Hubble radius, then we have:
k∗
aH
=
(
1 + r0
r
− 13w
0
) 1
2
(
r
− 13w
m
1 + rm
) 1
2
. (6)
Cosmology is possible when the above quantity is larger
than 1. This is true, in the case of w = −1, when:
r0 < rm <
(r0 + 1)
√
r20 + 4r0 − r20 − 3r0
2r0
. (7)
This range is somewhat larger for larger values of w, as
can be seen in figure 3. The number of modes available
for cosmology scales like the cube of (6):
Nm ∼
(
1 + r0
r
− 13w
0
) 3
2
(
r
− 13w
m
1 + rm
) 3
2
. (8)
Figure 3 shows the number of modes available to an
observer as a function of rm and of a; note that while
changing w affects the length of the period during which
cosmology can be done, the shape of the distribution of
modes as a function of r or a is always strongly peaked
and broadly unchanged for different values of w.
In order to calculate the probability P (r ≥ 0.4), we will
need the number of modes in terms of rΛ when ΩΛ > Ωm.
This is given by:
NΛ ∼
(
1 + r0
r
− 13w
0
) 3
2
(
r
1+ 13w
Λ
1 + rΛ
) 3
2
. (9)
B. Probability Distribution for r
To calculate the probability distribution function p(r),
we begin by constructing p(r|r ≡ rm) and p(r|r ≡ rΛ).
The probabilities should be proportional to a function of
the number modes available:
p(r|r ≡ rm) ∼ fm (Nm(r))
p(r|r ≡ rΛ) ∼ fΛ (NΛ(r)) . (10)
There are at several reasonable choices for the form of
the function fi, depending on one’s model of measure-
ment. On general grounds, one should expect the fi to
be monotonic (measurement is clearly easier when more
modes are available), but beyond that it is hard to justify
a particular choice of fi. For definiteness I will begin with
the fi as powers of Ni, this corresponds to the assump-
tion that an observer’s awareness of the value of r scales
with the number of data points available. Another plausi-
ble choice of model of the measurement process would be
to assume that measurements are impossible below some
threshold in N , but equally likely above said threshold4.
This choice is covered in appendix B.
In the case when the fi are powers of N :
p(r|r ≡ rm) = Am [Nm(r)]bm
p(r|r ≡ rΛ) = AΛ [NΛ(r)]bΛ . (11)
The quantities Am, AΛ are given by the requirements
that:∫ 1
0
p(r|r ≡ rmdr) =
∫ 1
0
p(r|r ≡ rΛ)dr = 1 . (12)
One then obtains the following expressions for the con-
ditional probabilities:
p(r|r ≡ rm) = Am
(
r
− 13w
m
1 + rm
) 3bm
2
p(r|r ≡ rΛ) = AΛ
(
r
1+ 13w
Λ
1 + rΛ
) 3bΛ
2
. (13)
4 I am grateful to Mike Salem for raising this issue.
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FIG. 3: These two plots illustrate how the number of modes available to an observer changes as a function of rm and of a.
In each case r0 = 10
−12 (which is approximately the value for our universe, if we assume dark energy is a pure cosmological
constant). w = −1 for the most finely dashed line and then -0.9, -0.8, -0.7 and -0.6 as the dashing increases in width. Note
the increasing w increases the amount of time available for cosmology but has little effect on the shape (and importantly the
peakedness) of N(rm). In each case the vertical line indicates the value of rm or a for current observers in our universe.
The pre-factors depending on r0 have been reabsorbed
into the Ai, which are now given by:
Am =
2− bmw
2 2F1
(
3bm
2 ,
(
1− bm2w
)
,
(
2− bm2w
)
,−1) ,
AΛ =
2 + 3bΛ +
bΛ
w
22F1
(
3bΛ
2 ,
(
1 + bΛ2
(
3 + 1w
))
,
(
2 + bΛ2
(
3 + 1w
))
,−1) .
(14)
2F1 is a hypergeometric function.
To calculate p(r) from the conditional probabilities
now just requires an application of Bayes’ theorem:
p(r) = p(r|r ≡ rm)P (r ≡ rm) + p(r|r ≡ rΛ)P (r ≡ rΛ)
= qp(r|r ≡ rm) + (1− q)p(r|r ≡ rΛ)
(15)
In the second line I’ve set q as the probability that we live
in an epoch of matter domination. If we further assume
bm = bΛ, the complete (and unwieldy) expression for p(r)
is then:
p(r) =
q
(
2− bw
)
2 2F1
(
3b
2 ,
(
1− b2w
)
,
(
2− b2w
)
,−1)
(
r−
1
3w
1 + r
) 3b
2
+
(1− q) (2 + 3b+ bw )
22F1
(
3b
2 ,
(
1 + b2
(
3 + 1w
))
,
(
2 + b2
(
3 + 1w
))
,−1)
(
r1+
1
3w
1 + r
) 3b
2
. (16)
p(r) is plotted in figure 4 for various values of q, b and w.
The probability that observers measure r at its present
value or larger is then given by:
P (r ≥ 0.4) =
∫ 1
0.4
p(r)dr . (17)
In the case that q = 1/2, b = 1 and w = −1, this eval-
uates to the far-from-fine-tuned P (r ≥ 0.4) = 0.71, and
this result is relatively insensitive to the particular val-
ues of b, q and w. Plots of P (r ≥ 0.4) as a function of b,
q and w are given in figure 5, where it can clearly been
seen that for all plotted values the probability remains
between 0.4 and 1, and so the absence of fine-tuning is
robust to varying these parameters .
Before moving on to a discussion of the above results,
I’d like to briefly return to an observation from the be-
ginning of this section. So far only the number modes
has been considered as constraining the ability of an ob-
server to do cosmology. However, as well as the num-
ber of measurements, one might also consider the ease
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FIG. 5: Plots of P (r ≥ 0.4) as functions (from left to right) of q, b and w. The top left plot has b = 1/3, 2/3, 1, 2, 3 in
order of increasing dash width (w = −1), the bottom plot has w = −1,−0.75,−0.5,−0.4,−0.35 (b = 1) in order of increasing
dash width. In the middle column, the top plot has q = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 as the dash width increases (w = −1), and w
varies as its lefthand neighbor in the bottom plot (q = 0.5). Finally, in order of increasing dash width, the top right plot has
b = 1/3, 2/3, 1, 2, 3 (q = 0.5) and the bottom right plot has q = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 (b = 1).
of making those measurements. The latter quantity is
not as easy to find a suitable proxy for, but one possi-
bility could be the ability of cosmologists to distinguish
between accelerating and non-accelerating cosmologies.
This could entail, for example, finding an expression for
how the difference in the luminosity-redshift relation be-
tween an accelerating and decelerating cosmology varies
as a function of r. If one did this, one would find a
slightly greater pressure towards large r when Ωm > ΩΛ
and towards small r when Ωm < ΩΛ. However, numerical
investigations suggest that the probabilities are altered
by around 10%, which would have no effect on the above
conclusions. Moreover, in the absence of a compelling
reason to do so, it is better to model selection effects
with as little sensitivity to detailed physics as possible.
III. CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS
The strengths and weaknesses of the above argument
are reviewed below, but before we get to those there are a
couple of as yet undiscussed caveats that should be men-
tioned. The first is that the reasoning used herein does
not apply to dynamical dark energy models, where the
period of acceleration is temporary. Of course, this sim-
ply means that the “why now?” problem must be added
to the list of challenges such models face. In addition, by
not including Ωr in my model, I have implicitly ignored
the (possible) coincidence of our epoch of existence and
that of matter-radiation equality. Such a coincidence is
considerably milder in magnitude than that of the dark
energy and matter coincidence, with Ωr/Ωm ∼ 10−4.
8However, the naive expectation should be that this ra-
tio is close to its lowest possible value. There may well
be an anthropic explanation for this fine(ish)-tuning, but
in this paper it remains a mystery.
The calculations in the previous section demonstrate
that the coincidence problem is an artifact of selection
bias. This demonstration required the following assump-
tions:
• Selection effects are a sufficient explanation of fine-
tuning.
• An expectation that we are more likely to find our-
selves measuring r where most of the measurements
of r are possible is a sensible selection effect.
• The frequency of measurements of r is correlated
with the number of cosmological modes within a
single Hubble radius, N(r).
• There are no other factors that have a significant
effect on the frequency of measurements of r.
With these assumptions the argument follows straightfor-
wardly: observers are more likely to measure r when it’s
easy to measure, r is easy to measure when there are lots
of modes available to the observer, there are lots of modes
available to the observer when r is close to 1, q.e.d. Of
course, there still remains the justification of the above
assumptions. While the above points have been defended
at the relevant points in the body of the text, it is useful
to review the arguments before we finish.
Defenses of the anthropic principle are manyfold, and
there is little I can offer that will persuade the unper-
suaded reader. That said, I suppose it behoves one to try.
Fine tuning problems can, in the most part, be viewed
as statements about selection effects, if not in real space
at least in the space of possible worlds. This is especially
true with regards to the cosmological coincidence, where
the problem can be rephrased as: “If our epoch of exis-
tence is selected (log) uniformly in time, why are we so
fortunate as to live in the epoch of matter and dark en-
ergy equality?” All the principle of mediocrity states is
that existence is not selected from a uniform distribution
and that we can make reasonable deductions about what
that distribution should be.
Of course, making “reasonable” deductions, is far from
straightforward. In the case of this paper I have argued
that cosmologists should expect to find themselves living
in the epoch when most cosmology can be done, and that
furthermore, this epoch is the one in which the greatest
number of visible modes. The correlation between num-
ber of modes and number of measurements contains an
implicit assumption that there is bound structure. More-
over, there are methods (though somewhat constrained
ones) to continue cosmology after all else but the local
structure has exited the horizon; one such method is the
measurement of cosmological parameters using hyper-
velocity stars, discussed by Loeb in [20]. With that said,
precision cosmology will be certainly be harder in the
future, even if it is not impossible.
The use of only N(r) to construct p(r) can be defended
on several grounds. Firstly, incorporating additional de-
pendence on the ease of discriminating between cosmolo-
gies did not substantially change my conclusions. Sec-
ondly, the peakedness of N(r) suggests that it would take
a substantial anthropic counterweight to restore a pres-
sure to small values of r, and one has trouble conceiving
of what such an effect could be. Finally, the calculation
of N(r) requires little additional physics and is mostly
insensitive to additional cosmological parameters (in par-
ticular, details of the spectrum, of structure formation,
of the physics of radiation and so on); this suggests that
marginalizing over additional parameters would not ef-
fect the form of N(r).
The alert reader will have realized that I glossed over a
key point in my defense of the assumptions of this paper:
Why should cosmologists expect to live when cosmology
is easiest? Isn’t my whole argument trivial? Really all
that’s been done is to show that we live in the era of
engaging cosmology, without answering the question of
why we live in interesting times.
Well, in much the same way as students of climate
change were unlikely to be found before the climate
started changing, so it is with cosmologists. In epochs
where cosmology is verging on the impossible, the ques-
tions about the apparent interestingness (or otherwise)
of cosmology are unlikely to be asked.
We are fortunate enough to live in interesting times,
but if we did not, we would be blissfully unaware of that
fact.
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Appendix A: p(r) Without Selection Effects
Let’s begin by considering p(r) when p(a) ∼ 1
p(r) =
da
dr
p(a) ∼ da
dr
. (A1)
Noting r ∼ a3 when Ωm > ΩΛ and r ∼ a−3 when ΩΛ >
Ωm, this gives:
p (r|Ωm > ΩΛ) ∼ r−2/3
p (r|ΩΛ > Ωm) ∼ r−4/3 . (A2)
9To calculate p(r) we also need P (Ωm > ΩΛ) and P (ΩΛ >
Ωm):
P (Ωm > ΩΛ) =
∫ a1
ai
da∫ af
ai
da
=
a1 − ai
af − ai ∼ 0 (A3)
P (ΩΛ > Ωm) =
∫ af
a1
da∫ af
ai
da
=
af − a1
af − ai ∼ 1 . (A4)
a1 is the value of a when r = 1. The last approximate
equality in each line corresponds to taking the limit ai 
a1  af . Thus:
P (r ≥ 0.4) =
∫ 1
0.4
r−4/3dr∫ 1
rf
r−4/3dr
=
1.07
r
−1/3
f − 1
∼ a1
af
∼ e−Htf . (A5)
H is the asymptotic value of the Hubble constant for a
cosmological constant dominated universe, H2 = Λ/3.
A cutoff (rf , tf , af ) is introduced in the normalization
of the probability to keep everything finite. As a result,
one finds that, because of the large future volume, the
probability of measuring r ≥ 0.4 is exponentially small
as a function of the cutoff time.
Now let us consider p(r) when p(ln a) ∼ 1. With the
dependence of r on a as before, this gives:
p (r|Ωm > ΩΛ) ∼ r−1 , p (r|ΩΛ > Ωm) ∼ r−1 . (A6)
Since p(a) ∼ a−1, P (Ωm > ΩΛ) and P (ΩΛ > Ωm) are
given by:
P (Ωm > ΩΛ) ∼
ln a1ai
ln
af
ai
, P (ΩΛ > Ωm) ∼
ln
af
a1
ln
af
ai
.
Then for the probability that r ≥ 0.4, one has:
P (r ≥ 0.4) = 1
ln
af
ai
(∫ 1
0.4
r−1dr
)(
ln a1ai
− ln ri −
ln
af
a1
ln rf
)
∼ 1
ln
af
ai
(
ln a1ai
−3 ln aia1
− ln
af
a1
−3 ln afa1
)
∼ 1
ln
af
ai
∼ 1
Htf − 23 ln tit1
. (A7)
Once again the probability of measuring r ∼ O(1) is
determined by the cutoffs. In this case both early and
late time cutoffs are important, though the sensitivity is
somewhat less.
Appendix B: A Different Choice for fi
Instead of taking a power law relationship between p(r)
and N(r), one can take a threshold approach, where all
measurements are considered equal when the number of
modes available to the observer is greater than some min-
imum value.
To calculate the value of P (r ≥ 0.4) in such a model of
measurement requires more than just specifying a mini-
mum number of modes; one also needs to define “equally
likely”. There are a number of different interpretations
of the assumption that measurements are equally prob-
able after the threshold number of modes has been ex-
ceeded. Three reasonable possibilities are p(r) = const,
p(a) = const and p(ln a) = const. These will give dif-
ferent values of the amount (or otherwise) of fine-tuning
inherent in our measurements of r.
Considering the w = −1 case and setting the minimum
number of modes needed to observe r as n, one finds:
p(r) = const , P (r ≥ 0.4) ∼ 0.6
1− r0n2 ,
p(a) = const , P (r ≥ 0.4) ∼ (r1/20 n)1/3 ,
p(ln a) = const , P (r ≥ 0.4) ∼ 1
− ln
[
r
1/2
0 n
] . (B1)
The quantity r
−1/2
0 is approximately equal to the max-
imum number of modes that will ever available to an
observer, so r
1/2
0 n is the fraction of the maximal data
available that is needed to make an observation. In the
first case above P (r ≥ 0.4) is not finely tuned at all. In
the second and third cases the tuning is worst if we as-
sume n = 1. For our universe, where r0 ∼ 10−12, this is
a fine-tuning of ∼ 1/100 for p(a) = const and ∼ 1/10 for
p(ln a) = const.
[1] S. M. Carroll, Living Rev.Rel. 4, 1 (2001), astro-
ph/0004075.
[2] S. M. Carroll (2001), astro-ph/0107571.
[3] S. Weinberg, pp. 18–26 (2000), astro-ph/0005265.
[4] C. H. Lineweaver and C. A. Egan, Astrophys.J. (2007),
astro-ph/0703429.
[5] E. J. Copeland, M. Sami, and S. Tsujikawa,
Int.J.Mod.Phys. D15, 1753 (2006), hep-th/0603057.
[6] S. Dodelson, M. Kaplinghat, and E. Stewart,
Phys.Rev.Lett. 85, 5276 (2000), astro-ph/0002360.
[7] J. Garriga, M. Livio, and A. Vilenkin, Phys.Rev. D61,
023503 (2000), astro-ph/9906210.
[8] J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, Phys.Rev. D64, 023517
(2001), hep-th/0011262.
10
[9] S. A. Bludman (2000), astro-ph/0002204.
[10] C. A. Egan and C. H. Lineweaver, Phys.Rev. D78,
083528 (2008), 0712.3099.
[11] S. Weinberg, Phys.Rev.Lett. 59, 2607 (1987).
[12] H. Martel, P. R. Shapiro, and S. Weinberg, Astrophys.J.
492, 29 (1998), astro-ph/9701099.
[13] B. Carter, IAU Symp. 63, 291 (1974).
[14] A. Vilenkin, Phys.Rev.Lett. 74, 846 (1995), gr-
qc/9406010.
[15] A. Vilenkin (2011), 1108.4990.
[16] B. Freivogel, Class.Quant.Grav. 28, 204007 (2011),
1105.0244.
[17] R. Bousso, B. Freivogel, S. Leichenauer, and V. Rosen-
haus, Phys.Rev. D84, 083517 (2011), 1012.2869.
[18] R. Bousso, B. Freivogel, S. Leichenauer, and V. Rosen-
haus, Phys.Rev.Lett. 106, 101301 (2011), 1011.0714.
[19] B. D. Sherwin, J. Dunkley, S. Das, J. W. Appel, J. Bond,
et al., Phys.Rev.Lett. 107, 021302 (2011), 1105.0419.
[20] A. Loeb, JCAP 1104, 023 (2011), 1102.0007.
